On certiorari, the initial question before the Supreme Court was whether a prior conviction for possession of a sawed-off shotgun constituted a ''violent felony'' under the residual clause of the ACCA. 6 However, after argument, the Supreme Court asked for supplemental briefing and re-argument on whether the residual clause itself, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(B)(ii), was unconstitutionally vague. 7 In an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Court held that imposition of an increased sentence under the ACCA's residual clause violates the Due Process Clause's vagueness prohibition:
We are convinced that the indeterminacy of the wideranging inquiry required by the residual clause both denies fair notice to defendants and invites arbitrary enforcement by judges. Increasing a defendant's sentence under the clause denies due process of law.
8
. . .
Invoking so shapeless a provision to condemn someone to prison for 15 years to life does not comport with the Constitution's guarantee of due process.
9
The Court's holding invalidated the residual clause in its entirety because the Court rejected the argument that ''a vague provision is constitutional merely because there is some conduct that clearly falls within the provision's grasp. ' Defendants whose ACCA sentences depend on convictions that qualified only under the residual clause can pursue motions and petitions for relief to challenge the increase from a statutory range of 0 to 10 years for possession of a firearm under § 922(g) to the range of 15 years to life under the ACCA. Other defendants sentenced under statutes and guidelines with provisions analogous to the ACCA residual clause may also be able to seek relief based on the Johnson holding.
III. The Effects of Johnson Beyond the ACCA
The Supreme Court's holding invalidating the residual clause should apply beyond the ACCA to statutory or sentencing guideline provisions that combine a ''serious potential risk'' criterion with application of the categorical approach. The most directly analogous provision is found in the career-offender sentencing guideline, where the United States Sentencing Commission used language identical to the ACCA residual clause in the definition of ''crime of violence. ' • Penalties regarding distribution and storage of explosive materials under 18 U.S.C. § § 842 and 844.
IV. Procedural Mechanisms for Review
The prospective benefits for incarcerated individuals from Johnson should be relatively straightforward: defense attorneys should assert and preserve challenges to prior convictions that implicate residual clauses in cases at trial, at sentencing, and on direct appeal. The big questions for obtaining review will arise in the many cases where individuals are serving illegal sentences after direct review is over. In general, the procedural mechanism for review of sentencing claims will depend on the stage of litigation. Generally, relief should be available for those individuals who have not previously filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. An individual who is filing a first petition under § 2255 must satisfy three procedural requirements: (1) the claim must be cognizable under § 2255(a), (2) the decision referenced as a basis for relief must be retroactive, and (3) the petition must be timely under § 2255(f). The government appears to be waiving discretionary procedural defenses in ACCA cases. 53 First, a claim is cognizable under § 2255(a) when a sentence is ''in excess of the maximum authorized by law'' or is ''imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.'' A defendant serving an invalid ACCA sentence qualifies on both grounds. The 15-year mandatory minimum ACCA sentence is five years above the statutory maximum of ten years authorized under law for violations of § 922(g), meaning that an individual unlawfully sentenced under the ACCA is subject to a sentence beyond the statutory maximum. 54 When defendants are subject to a sentence beyond the statutory maximum, their due process rights are violated because they are serving per se illegal sentences that the law cannot impose upon them. Note that the one-year limitation period runs from the ''latest of'' the date described in § 2255(f)(3) or the ''date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final'' under § 2255(f)(1). If the conviction became final within the year before Johnson and the petitioner has one or more clams in addition to a Johnson claim, it may be prudent to file a first § 2255 raising all claims together within a year of the conviction becoming final. If the Johnson claim is filed later, it will be a successor motion subject to the requirements of § 2255(h). If a first § 2255 is pending, it would be wise to supplement it with a Johnson claim lest the Johnson claim be deemed successive. After an initial § 2255 motion, a defendant can seek permission from the court of appeals to file a second or successive motion. 61 79 As the government has conceded in a number of guideline cases on direct appeal, Johnson's constitutional holding applies to the guidelines whether they are mandatory or advisory. 80 The Government correctly explained in Pagan-Soto:
The Guidelines crime-of-violence residual clause uses the same language that Johnson challenges to pre-Booker mandatory guideline sentences are cognizable not only because they are unconstitutional, but because they too result in a sentence ''in excess of the maximum authorized by law. '' 87 Prior to Booker, the guidelines were ''binding on all judges'' and ''ha[d] the force and effect of laws,'' by virtue of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), a congressional statute directed to the courts. 88 The top of the guideline range thus provided the relevant maximum sentence authorized by law, and an erroneous sentence above the top of the guideline range exceeded the maximum authorized by law. In Brown v. Pre-Booker Johnson errors are even more egregious than statutory Begay errors because they take a defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum and they violate the Constitution. 91 Finally, in addition to skewing the guidelines toward a harsher sentence, career offender status causes ongoing damage to drug defendants because it disqualifies them from the benefits of retroactive guideline amendments that ameliorate overly severe guideline provisions. 92 For example, in 2014, the Sentencing Commission determined that the Drug Quantity Table should be reduced by two levels and that past sentences should be corrected. 93 Defendants who have been unconstitutionally designated as career offenders not only had their sentences unlawfully enhanced at the time of sentencing, they cannot receive the benefits that, under a constitutional sentencing scheme, would have benefitted them retroactively. And it's worse for crack defendants. In addition to the recent two-level overall reduction, the Commission in 2007 and 2011 retroactively reduced the crack offense levels by two levels, then additionally reduced the 100:1 powder-to-crack cocaine ratio to 18:1. 94 Again, the unconstitutional career offender designation barred these sentence reductions. Leaving unconstitutional career offender designations in place perpetuates the over-incarceration and racial disparities that retroactive amendments were intended to address, costing years of unjust incarceration and millions in wasted incarceration expenses.
V. Starting Points for Litigation
In looking at Johnson sentencing claims, a few starting points should be emphasized. First, individuals need representation on Johnson issues, so defense attorneys should assist them in applying for appointed counsel under the Criminal Justice Act. 95 Second, these cases, like any others, require negotiation. In some litigation involving sentencing errors under the ACCA, the government has declined to assert potential procedural obstacles. 96 Faced with sentencing errors, some prosecutors have conceded without extensive litigation and entered into agreed judgments. Thus, negotiation should be an initial step. 97 Third, practitioners should move quickly but deliberately in these cases. Once the cases have been identified, the presentence report and the docket sheet should provide the basic information to determine whether there is a viable Johnson claim and what procedural device is most suitable. Those filing under § § 2255(e) and 2241 need to research questions of venue and choice of law. Although § 2241 claims regarding the manner of execution of a sentence are generally filed in the district of custody, the sentencing district may be the appropriate venue to file § 2241 petitions that challenge the lawfulness of the sentence under the § 2255(e) escape hatch. In any event, the law of the home district should govern the legality of the sentence, regardless of where the case is filed, given § 2255's default to the home district. 98 
VI. Last Thoughts about ACCA Litigation
The ACCA is not only poorly drafted, but its irrational harshness has become one of the engines driving mass over-incarceration in America. 99 Remember the recent Sixth Circuit case where possession of shotgun shells under benign circumstances required the judge to blind his conscience and impose the 15-year mandatory minimum, even though the defendant had not been in trouble for over twenty years? 100 In the concurring opinion, after comparing the result to something out of a Charles Dickens novel, one judge said, ''I therefore join the continuous flood of voices expressing concern that the ACCA and other mandatory minimum laws are ineffective in achieving their purpose and damaging to our federal criminal justice system and our nation.'' 101 Under the ACCA, prior convictions can be for relatively innocuous conduct and they never become stale, no matter how old. As a federal defender wrote back in 1994:
A hunter in possession of a rifle is stopped by a game warden. The hunter has led an exemplary life for thirty-five years. A record check reveals that in 1959 he was convicted at the age of eighteen for three unarmed burglaries of businesses in a single night, in which little or nothing was taken. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, the hunter is an armed career criminal subject to a mandatory term of fifteen years incarceration, with no probation or parole, and a potential sentence of life without parole. A penal statute's moral validity should be reflected in society's acceptance of both the prohibition and the punishment as generally applied. There are undoubtedly individuals who, merely by possessing a firearm, create an easily recognized danger to the community based on their prior convictions for crimes of violence. However, the ACCA is so loosely written that appropriate application is aberrational, rather than the norm. 102 More than twenty years have passed since those words were written, yet individuals continue to be subjected to punishments under the ACCA and the guidelines identical residual clause that are far in excess of what is fair and reasonable. When the court or the government corrects sentences based on unconstitutional sentencing enhancements, they are making the punishment at least somewhat closer to fitting the crime. permits, based on a pure legal error that was exposed as incorrect by intervening decisions of this Court and the court of appeals. Petitioner has had no other opportunity to assert these claims. The government believes that in these circumstances the interests of justice warrant relief, and the government therefore does not oppose such relief by asserting discretionary procedural defenses.''). 
